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Abstract - In this paper the formation of expectations during decision-
making processes on pension schemes is the main focus. Politicians decide
on the intergenerational transfer scheme and the young decide on savings.
The politicians display Nash-behavior towards future generations of
politicians and are the Stackelberg-leaders with the current young as
followers. No generation of decision-makers is committed to previous
decisions. If the exogenous parameters of the system are constant the
benefit rate and the saving rate will become constant within a finite time
interval provided a public pension system exists in the stationary-state.
Under perfect foresight, a calculation of finite length suffices for the
current decision-makers to generate the path of taxes and savings towards
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1. Introduction
In most developed countries, a substantial part of the elderly's income is
provided for by means of public and private pension schemes. Generally,
public pension plans are financed by a Pay-As-You-Go (abbreviated from now
on as PAYG) system where current pension payments are financed by current
tax payments. Fund raising as in a Capital Reserve (abbreviated from now
on as CR) system, in principle, does not occur. On the other hand, private
pension schemes are typically finenced by a CR-system.l) They are
generally decided upon during wage negotiations. In this paper we will
assume that these wage negotiations are decentralized and that no
coordination between the different decision-making processes is possible.
The operation of PAYG-systems has drawn a great deal of attention
recently due to the aging of the population which has become apparent
since the 19~0's. Because of this aging the long-run effects of PAYG-
systems compared with CR-systems may be to reduce the lifetime ut111ty of
future generations. In view of this it is natural to ask in what sense
public pension schemes and private pension schemes interact in the face of
demographic change. This paper deals with the interaction between PAYG-
financed old-age transfers and private pension schemes.
The interaction between private and public pension schemes has
already been studied to a certain extent, for example in the paper by
Boadway and Wildasin (1989). They used a median-voter framework in an
overlapping-generations model, for the first time introduced in the
literature by Samuelson (1958). In the Boadway-Widasin paper individuals
are constrained in the sense that they cannot borrow against future public
pension benefits. The probability of the constraint being binding, and
thus keeping individuals off the optimal consumption path, obviously
depends on the level of the tax rate. In particular, the higher the tax
rate, the lower individual savings will be and the higher the probability
that the individual will be constrained to borrow. If the borrowing
constraint is binding, individuals prefer to consume more now instead of
1) An exception to this case is France. Moreover, in most OECD countries
the (private) pension schemes of public sector employees are run on a
PAYG-bnsiti.2
when they are retired, and thus the benefit level (or the tax rate)
preferred by the median voter will be negatively related to the benefit
level of the public pension scheme (or tax rate) in existence up to the
time a new decision has to be made. This feature ensures interior
solutions of the tax rate. Another fundamental assumption that drives
their dynamic results is that individuals believe that a tax rate, once
established, will remain unchanged forever. Boadway and Wildasin find that
a cycle of alternating over- and undershooting tax rates comes about which
gradually damps down. This seems to fit the actual development of public
pension schemes in many countries, where after a gradual expansion of
PAYG-schemes recently measures have been taken to lower the level of
intergenerational transfers. But, these measures have been inspired by the
fall in population growth that cannot occur in the Boadway-Wildasin model
(see e.g. Thompson, 1983). The cycle that comes about in their model is
closely related to the way expectations are treated. Since individuals
assume tax rates to be constant, they will base their consumption and
saving plans on the tax rate at the time of planning. Therefore, if an
individual is faced with a high tax rate at the start of life, he will
start out with little savings. As a consequence, in the next period of his
life he will want to have a relatively low tax rate to increase his
second-period consumption and the other way around if the tax rate in the
first period of his life is low. So, the cycle occurring in the Boadway-
Wildasin model can be ascribed to the wrong expectations held by young
generations.
Another interesting paper that deals with the interaction between
public pensions and savings is the paper by Hansson and Stuart (1989).
They use a two-overlapping-generations model to consider the evolution of
public pension schemes. In their paper transfers are motivated by
altruism. The assumption is made that decisions on public pension schemes
are inherently constitutional, which in the two-generations model implies
that a living generation can block legislation that would make it worse
off. At the time of the introduction of the public pension scheme the
living generatións, who have perfect foresight, decide on the value of the
transfers to the old and the savings by the young for the current time
period and all future time periods. It is shown that a scheme will be
chosen that cannot be amended by any future pair of generations and in3
which, furthermore, savings will go to zero, or, in other words,
successive increases in the benefit level of public pension schemes will
occur.
In actual fact public pension schemes are seldom part of the
constitution. Every period the decision-makers are free to change the
system to their own discretion and, indeed, public pension schemes are
frequently changed. Obviously, if such changes are possible the Hansson-
Stuart framework does not necessarily give a clue to what the future
development of public pension schemes will be. Moreover, as stated above,
many changes in public pension plans are inspired by demographic changes.
But, just as in the Boadway-Wildasin paper, Hansson and Stuart assume a
constant rate of population growth. Another important point is that in the
Hansson-Stuart paper the decisive generations know by what mechanisms all
other generations are driven in both their savings and transfer decisions.
But, in reality, these two decisions are separated from one another. In
principle, decision-making on intergenerational transfers takes place in
political processes, while, as mentioned above, decisions on private
pension schemes are generally determined during wage negotiations.
Obviously, decision-makers in one field do not necessarily have all the
information on the decision-msking process in the other field. Indeed, one
of the points of this paper is that for the development of public and
private pension schemes in the face of demographic change it is of
essential importance to know to what degree both sides of the decision-
making process have information of the other side.
A paper that deals with the effects of demographic change is the
paper by Boadway, Marchand and Pestieau (1990). (A similar framework is
developed by Peters, 1990.) They consider a government that wants to
maximize the undiscounted sum of utilities of successive generations. They
show that under demographic changes and productivity fluctuations it will
be optimal to smooth the development of lifet3me incomes and utilities of
the successive generations. This is accomplished by a system of social
security benefits which is financed by a PAYG-system. If it is possible to
borrow from the rest of the world the smoothing can be much larger, while
if taxes and transfers lead to excess burdens the smoothing will be less.
Boadway, Marchand and Pestieau consider the problem from a normative point
of view. This implies that the governments succeeding the planner are4
assumed not to deviate from the optimal path, i.e. it ís possible for the
planning government to commit its successors (see also Boadway, Marchand
and Pestieau, 1989, p. 12). As is already emphasized above in the context
of the Hansson-Stuart paper, this assumption seems wholly unjustified in a
positive framework.
From the above survey it can be concluded that the role of
expectations is not yet satisfactorily modelled in the literature
concerning public pension schemes. Therefore, this will be the main focus
of this paper. We start from the assumption that every period a decision
is made on the intergenerational transfer scheme by politicians and a
decision is made by the private pension funds on the size of savings. The
private pension funds are supposed to be effectively representing the
young individuals' interests, which implies that from now on the concepts
of private pension funds and generation of young individuals can be used
interchangeably when decision-making is concerned. In taking these
decisions the decision-makers are not committed in any way to measures
taken by past generations. In this sense our paper differs from the
constitutional framework adopted by Hansson and Stuart and the normative
approach of Boadway, Marchand and Pestieau. The horizon of the decision-
makers is assumed infinitely long. In contrast with the Boadway-Wildasin
paper we assume that the decision-makers have perfect foresight. Because
no generation of decision-makers is committed to previous decisiona, every
generation has to build an expectation of the outcome of the future
decision-making process for itself. As, however, this outcome is in turn
determined by the expectations held by the next generation of decision-
makers, an in principle endless sequence of expectations has to be formed
before a generation can take a decision of its own. But, in a situation in
which the exogenous parameters of the system, such as demographics,
productivity and real rate of interest, become constant after a certain
time period, the benefit rate and the saving rate may become equal to
constant values as well within a finite time interval. For the model
presented in this paper it can be proved that this is actually true if a
public pension scheme exists in the stationary-state. Under the assumption
of perf'ect knowledge about the exogenous variables, the decision-makers
will in that case also be able to foresee the emergence of this
stationary-state. Given that knowledge, a calculation of fínite lengthsuffices to generate the path of taxes and savings towards the stationary-
state. So, in our framework decision-makers are able to base their
decisions on correct belíefs about the future development of the system,
without having to impose ad hoc restrictions on the possible outcomes of
the system.
The perfect foresight that is attributed to decision-makers in our
model can be of two kinds. First there is what we will call ex-post
perfect foresigtit: a generation can correctly calculate the development of
benefit and saving rates and take a decisíon based upon the outcome of
these calculations. Besides that, however, decision-makers can also have
perfect foresight in an ex-ante sense. In that case, the decision-makers
establish the relationship between the decisions they themselves have to
make and decisions taken by other current or future decision-makers, by
making use of the calculations that generate the ex-post perfect foresight
outcomes. The knowledge about this relationship can then be used to
manipulate the decisions by others. Fvc-post perfect foresight corresponds
to Nash-behavior, where decisions are made while taking the other
decisions as given. Ex-ante perfect foresight, on the other hand,
corresponds to Stackelberg-behavior, where decisions are made taking the
decision-making processes of other agents into account.
In this paper two groups of decision-makers are distinguished, i.e.
the politicians deciding on benefits for the old and the young deciding on
savings. In principle, these two groups can display Nash- or Stackelberg-
behavior towards each other. In other words, they can have ex-post or ex-
ante expectations about the decisions of the other group of decision-
makers. But expectations of future decisions also play a part in the
current decision-making process. These can, in principle, also be of an
ex-ante or an ex-post nature. Since we assume decentralized and
uncoordinated decision-making by the young, the influence of each young
decision-maker on the behavior of politicians is negligibly small. This
rules out the possibility for the young to display Stackelberg-behavior
towards future or current politicians. That leaves open four cases that
may fit our model. To begin with, the current politicians can display
Nash-behavior towards both future generations of politicians and the
young. Secondly, they can display Nash-behavior towards future generations
of politicians, while being the Stackelberg-leaders with the young as6
followers. Thirdly, they can be the Stackelberg-leaders towards future
generations of decision-makers and behave Nash-like towards the young.
Finally, the current politicians can be Stackelberg-leaders with both
future generations of politicians and the young as followers. As will be
discussed in section 6, the third and fourth case will lead to problems if
the future generation of politicians can be assumed to be Stackelberg-
leaders in turn. In the first case, if the politicians can calculate what
the decisions made by young individuals will be, they also will be able to
use these calculations to solve their own optimization problem. In other
words, it is hard to imagine why in this case politiciana can have ex-post
expectations without necessarily also having ex-ante expectations.
Therefore, most attention will be given in this paper to the second case.
The set-up of this paper is as follows. In section 2 the basic
model will be introduced. In this model the young will be supposed to
allocate consumption to different periods by maximizing a lifetime utility
function. The politicians maximize a utility function in which the utility
of the old and the young are combined. In section 3 the stationary-states
will be derived. Section 4 describes the effects of a temporary
demographic shock. In section 5 the economic interpretation of the model
will be considered. Section 6 contains concluding comments.
2. The model
We start from the well-known two-overlapping-generations model where every
individual lives for two periods. An individual born at time t will be
endowed with one unit of a good at the start of life. A non-negative part
of Lhis c~ndowment has to be transferred to the government (Tt), part of it
is used for savings (st, which also cannot be negative and which will earn
no interest) and the remainder is used for consumption (ct). So we get
ct - 1 - st - Tt (1)
When old, the individual consumes its savings and the transfer payment ~t
to be received from the government:7
r
ct - st-1 } ~t (2)
The population born at time t is assumed to be composed of identical
individuals and is of size Nt. The development of the population is
dictated by the relation Nt - ntNt-1, where nt is exogenously
determined.2) The government has as its only activity providing transfers
to the old which are financed by taxing the young. Assuming no
administrative costs the budget restriction of this PAYG-system reads
~tNt-1 - TtNt which implies
~t - ntTt (3)
We assume that an individual born at time t has a lifetime utility
function that reads
Ut - U(C~) t U(C~al)
- u(1 - st - Tt) t u(st t nttiTt}1)
(4)
where u' ~ 0, u" C 0 and u'(o) - m and the second equality follows after
inserting eqs. (1) through (3). So, there is no time preference within a
generation and no account is taken of the utility of other (past or
future) generations. In such a framework old individuals will, of course,
prefer a maximum transfer. Young individuals, on the other hand, will not
consent voluntarily to contribute to a transfer system, provided they do
not perceive a positive relation between the contributions they pay when
they are young and the transfers they receive when they are old. As
stated above, the government in this model takes care of the transfers
-------------------------------------------------------
2) Note that because one period equals a generation, the average age
structure of a generation over one period is not influenced by the
development of the birth rates. This implies that there will not be an
autonomous cyclical reaction of the population growth to an initial
exogenous change, as would be the case if shorter time periods were
considered. On the other hand, there is an endogenous reaction to an
autonomous change in the population growth rate one period after the
change. This is due to the slow reaction of the population size to a
change in the birth rates, as one generation only covers half of the total
population. We will however abstract from this effect and thus assume the
population growth rate to be fully exogenous.ó
from the young to the old. In taking its decisions the government is under
pressure of both the old and the young to take account of these
generations' interest. It will be assumed that the degree to which the
government represents the interests of both groups ís exogenous. In
particular, politicians at time t act in accordance with the maximization
of a weighed combination of the utility functions of the old and the young
generation3)
Dt - ~u(ct-1) ' (1-~) nt{u(ct) t u(ct)}
(5)
-~ulst-1 } ntTt) t(1-~) nt{u(1 - st - Tt) t u(st t ntt1Tt,1)}
where the parameter a indicates the effective weight of an old indivídual
in the political process and the second equation is derived from the first
by using eqs. (1) through (3). In this model, if the old are in the
majority a maximum transfer need not necessarily come about as long as
a C 1.
Savings are determined by the young by maximizing eq. (4) subject
to the constraint of non-negative savings. The first-order condition for
this maximization problem is
u'(1 - Tt - st) 2 u'(st 4 nt~1Ttt1) (6)
where the inequality sign holds for zero savings. Note that the tax rates
Tt and Tttl have been taken as given. In this simple case eq. (6) boils
down to
1
st - max {0, 2(1 - tt - nttl~rt}1)} (7)
Obviously, savings depend on future tax rates. In particular, i f a high
future benefit is expected such that ~,t;l ) 1-~rt, savings will be zero.
3) See Cukierman (1990) and Verbon (1988) for a justification of this
function. Apart from the interest function approach adopted here, the
equation can just as well be interpreted as reflecting altruism of young
individuals, see Verbon (1988).9
Taking the saving rate st as given, transfers follow by maximizing
(5) under the restriction that they cannot be negative. The first-order
condition for this problem reads
~u'(st-1 } nt~t) 5(1-a) u'(1 - st - Tt) (8)
where the inequality sign holds if tt - 0. Notice that the size of the tax
rate at t is no direct function of future decisions, but depends on
current and past savings rates (st and st-1) and demographics (nt) onlY.
Moreover, if the political power of the old, measured by ~ is smaller than
the political power of the 1 young (i.e. ~~ 2), the current consumption of
the latter group will be higher than of the first group, while the
reversed holds for ~ ~ 2.
Eqs. (~) and (8) determine the solutions for 2t and st under Nash-
behavior. In the context of our model, however, both (groups of) agents
know exactly how the other party determines the instrument variable under
their control (st for the young and 2t for the politicians). But, as
already has been discussed in the introduction, the institutional setting
underlying our model prevents the young individuals from taking advantage
of their knowledge, because the decision-making on the saving rate is
decentralized and cannot be coordínated. The politicians, on the other
hand, do not face such institutional restrictions. Therefore they can
exploit their knowledge of the young individuals' decision-making process,
that is their knowledge of eq. (~), to manipulate the young's decisions.
That means that when the politicians determine the tax rate, they will
explicitly take into account how their decision influences the size of the
savings via eq. (~). I.n other words, the politicians are the Stackelberg-
leaders in a game with the current generation of savers. Then we get
instead of eq. (5)
if 2(1 - tt - nt}lTt}1) z 0( see eq. (7)),
Dt -~u(st-1 } ntTt) t 2(1-~) ntu{2(1 - Tt t nttlTttl)) Í9g)10
1
if 2(1 - Tt - nt~lTttl) ~ 0,
Dt -~u(St-1 ' nt~t) '(1-~) nt{u(1 - tt) t u(nt41Ttr1)} (9b)
It can readily be verified that if eq. (9a) holds the first-order
condition now reads instead of (8)
au'(St-1 ' ntTt) s(1-a) u'{2(1 - Tt t nt}lTt;l)} (io)
while if eq. (9b) holds condition (8) with st - 0 determines Tt. Thus, if
the politicians are the Stackelberg-leaders and the young have positive
savings, the future of the public pension scheme is of importance to the
political decision-making process. Changes in the expected future tax rate
will then lead to a change in the current tax rate.
3. Stationary-state results
Let us suppose that in every period decisions are made according to the
first-order conditions for Tt and st. If the rate of population growth is
a constant nt - n, st and ~Ct may become equal to constants st - s and
it - T, respectively (in the following, when the subscripts referring to
time are omitted the statíonary-state value is meant). In this section we
establish what these stationary-states will look like in the model
described in the previous section assuming that they actually exist.
First, we will consider the Nash-case in which both young individuals and
politicians take the other's decisions as given. Then we will work out the
case where the current politicians are the Stackelberg-leaders towards the
current young. Moreover, we will consider the conditions under which a
stntionr~i~y-statc tictunl ly exists rutd whether tt will be maintained if no
exogenous changes occur.
In the Nash-case, the stationary-state is described by11
~u'(s t nT) s(1-~) u'(1 - T- s) (11)
for it - T and
s- Z(1 - t- nT) Z 0 (12)
for st - s. Obviously, s will be positive if and only if i( 1~(ltn).
Moreover, it appears from eq. (11) that whether a positive transfer will
come about depends on the value of ~. It stands to reason that for high
values of a(large effective political power of the old) a positive value
of T is more likely to be generated than if a is small. In particular the
following proposition holds
Proposition 1: In a stationary-state with Nash-behavior of
politicians a positive transfer will exist if and only if ~ Z 1
2
Moreover, if ~( 2 in the stationary-state, then s- 2. Finally,
s) 0 and -c ) 0 is only possible when a- 1
2'
'1'lie proof of proposition 1 is straightforward. Suppose first a) 1-~ (or
~) 2). Then, if T- 0, it will hold that s- 2 and from condition (11) we
derive ~u'(2) s(1-~) u'(2) which implies a contradiction. So, t) 0. If
s) 0 can be assumed, it follows from (11) and ~) 2 that 1- T- s(
s t nT which, after inserting in condition (12), implies 2(1 - T t nT) ~
2(1 - T f nT), which is again a contradiction. So, s- 0. Suppose ~~ 1-~.
Then if T) 0 and s) 0 is assumed, the same contradiction 2(1 - i 4 nT) ~
1
Z(1 - z t n-c) can be derived. So, T) 0 or s) 0. Suppose s- 0. Then T Z
1~(ltn). From eq. (11) it follows that u'(n2) ) u'(1 - T) which implies
~r C 1~(ltn) which in turn is a contradiction. So s) 0 and T- 0, which
implies (see condition (12)) s- 2. Finally, suppose ~- 1-a. Then it
immediately follows that T Z 0 and s 2 0. QED.
ln the case that the politicians are the Stackelberg-leaders, the
first-order conditions in the stationary-state can easily be derived from
eqs. (~) and (8). They turn out to be same as in the Nash-case, except for
the first-order condition of the tax rates when 2(1 - i- nT) 2 0 holds,
which reads, instead of eq. (11)12
~u'(s ~ nT) 5(1-~) u'{2(1 - 2 t nT)}
It is straightforward to show the following proposition
(13)
Proposition 2: If the politicians know the decision-making process
of the young, the stationary-state which is eventually reached will
be of the same form as in proposition 1.
The proof of proposition 2 is completely analogous to the Nash-case,
therefore it will be left to the reader to work it out. The results of
proposition 1 and 2 are summed up in table 1.
Table 1. Stationary-state solutions in the Nash-case and Stackelberg-case
~ ~ Z ~ - 2 a ) 2
T- 0; s- 2 T Z 0; s Z 0 2~ 0; s- 0
To summarize, in a stationary-state the existence of a transfer
system depends solely on the political weights and not on the efficiency
of the system.4) The reason for this is, of course, that the young
generation takes the future tax rate as given and perceives no relation
between current and future tax rates. In that case the transfer system is
a pure loss for a young individual. If they have the larger weight, they
are able to abolish the transfer system in the long run even if there
exists one in the short run.
Two issues remain that have to be dealt with. The first issue is
whether a stationary-state will be reached within a finite time interval
if for one reason or enother a situation off the stationary-state is
occurring. In fact for the case in which transfers exist in the
4) As is well-known, an intergenerational transfer system is
intertemporally efficient if n) 1 under the conditions of the current
model. Aaron was the first to make this condition more explicit, Aaron
(1966).i3
stationar state 1 y- (i.e. a) 2), the equilibríum appears to be stable in the
above sense. Notice that this stationary-state will be reached without
having introduced a commitment technology as in Hansson and Stuart ( 1989).
For the case in which transfers do not exist in the stationary-state (i.e.
~ ~ 1
2), stability is lacking. In partícular, if the system gets off its
stationary-state, a movement away from this state may be set in or a
tendency in the direction of the stationary-state will aríse. In the
latter case the stationary-state will never actually be reached. As a
result, for a( 2 determination problems arise for the current decision-
makers in all cases. We formulate these results in proposition 3. Proofs
and a more detailed interpretation are given in the next section.
Proposition 3: If at some certain period the system is outside its
st.ationary-state while the parameters are constant, then the
development of' the tax rates will be such that the stationary-state
will be re-established within a finite time interval if a) 1. If
1 2
a ~ 2 a return to the stationary-state is impossible within the
context of our model.
The second issue is whether if the system happens to be in a stationary-
state, this state will be maintained if no further exogenous shocks occur.
We can state the following proposition
Proposition 4: The stationary-states which have been described in
proposition 1 and 2 are Nash equilibria between succeeding
generations.
Proposition 4 can easily be checked. Take first the case ~) 2, so that s
- 0 in the stationary-state. Given Tttl - T the question is whether at
time t the political process would generate a tax rate such that st ) 0
would result. If not then, obviously, Tt - T and a stationary-state would
not be disturbed at time t. Assume st ) 0. Maximizing decision-making
function (9a) produces au'(nTt) -(1-a) u'{2(1 - it t n2)} )(1-~) u'(nTt)
so that 2(1 - 2t - nT) t n(~ - Tt) ~ 0, or st ~ n(tt -~). Obviously,
tt s z so that st cannot become positive and Tt - T as a result. Consider
next the case ~~ 2 so that T- 0 in the stationary-state. As zttl - 0,14
st ~ 0 unless it - 1. If it - 1(and st - 0) the first-order condition
would read au'(n) -(1-a) u'(0) which obviously cannot hold. So st ) 0. If
Tt ~ 0 the first-order condition (10) would give ~u'(2 t nTt) -
(1-a) u'{2(1 - Tt)} C(1-a) u'(2 t nTt), which leads to the contradiction
zt ~ O. So ln both cases ~ ~ 2 and ~~ 2 no generation of politicians
would have an íncentive to leave the stationary-state once it is reached.
As the young in their saving decisions follow the politicians, they will
not deviate from the stationary-state either. QED.
Note, finally, that if ~~ 2 according to proposition 3 a
stationary-state will never be reached if an off-stationary-state
situation is occurring. On the other hand, proposition 4 says that if the
system happens to be in a stationary-state, there is no endogenous way out
of it. In the next section it will be made clear that exogenous changes in
the rate of population growth cannot disturb the no-transfer stationary-
state either.
4. Comparative-statics results: effects of a temporary demographic change
In reality, of course, no stationary-state can be observed. Actuelly, in
the post-war period large changes in private and public pension systems
occurred in the western world. Apart from other factors, changes in the
rate of population growth is one of the driving forces behind these
changes. More recently projected demographic changes have led politicians
to enact measures which implied a cut in benefit rights of the public
pension schemes.
In this section the effects of demographic changes in our model
will be considered starting from the assumption that the system is in a
stationary-state. We will only work out the case where the current
politicians are the Stackelberg-leaders towards the current young. If the
model is stable, demographic changes can only lead to temporary changes
(if any) in transfer and saving rates as the statíonary-state does not
depend on the actual rate of population growth, but only on the political
power weight ~. However, according to proposition 3 stabílity can only be
guaranteed if ~) 2, while if a~ 2 an off-stationary-state situation can15
never be restored. So, if our model has any explanatory value, the
observed changes in pension systems should be interpreted in terms of the
former case where ~) 2. Because of stability, the effects of temporary
shocks will then dampen out if no new shocks in demographics will occur.
Important to the argument of this section is the assumption that
the relevant decision-maker has perfect foresight with respect to the
decisions that are to be taken in the future, given the demographic shock.
In particular, if at time t it has become known for the first time that a
demographic change will occur at time ttj, the rational decision-maker at
time t can calculate whether this change will lead to a deviation from the
stationary-state at times ttj or ttj-1. If not, the demographic change
will not. have any effect anyhow. This will appear to be the case in what
follows below if ~~ Z. So, only if a) 2 the stationary-state can be
disturbed due to a demographic shock. This perturbation can have forward
and backward effects. But at some future time period the stationary-state
will establish itself again because of stability in the case where a) 1
2'
Then a finite calculation is sufficient for the current generation to
calculate the optimal decision on its own tax or saving rate. The current
generation has to write down the comparative-statics equations to be
derived from the first-order condition in order to calculate the future
effects. These future effects and the consequent current effects will now
be calculated for the model under consideration.
In the Stackelberg-case the politicians determine the development
of the transfer system, while the young follow with their savings. So, we
only need to keep track of the tax rates. Four cases can be distinguished,
i.e. a positive demographic shock for a( 2 and ~) 2, respectively, and a
negative demographic shock for a( 2 and ~) 2. First take the case in
which the young have the larger political weight in the decision-making
process, i.e. a C 2. A change in the rate of population growth in period
ttj is expressed in the parameter dn - dnt}j - nttj - n~ 0. The first-
order effect of the change in the rate of population growth on the savings
at time ttj-1 equals, according to eq. (7), ~stfj-1-
- 1(n ~T - T dn) -- 1 n ~T . If the first-order effect on the 2 ttj t~j ttj 2 t}j ttj
tax rate would be such that tt;j ) T- 0, then it follows from condition
(8) that16
a u " (st~j-1 ; nttjTttj) nttj~Tt}j -
-(1-~) u " {2(1 - Tt}j t nttjtitt4j}1)}~Tt}j (14)
which can only imply that ~tt}j - 0. So, the first-order effect of a
positive or negative demographic change on the tax rate and the saving
rate cannot differ from zero. This result is re-stated in the next
proposition
Proposition 5: When in the Stackelberg-model with ~~ 2 the
stationary-state with zero transfers exists, there is no way out of
it by means of temporary shocks.
Next take the case ~) 2, so that s- 0 and t Z 1~(ltn) in the stationary-
state. It can be proved that outside the stationary-state the tax rates
will be positive for all time periods.5) Moreover, as long as st}h - 0
for all h~ 0 after the change dn has become known, the stationary-state
tax rates will not change for h~ j-1, j. Notice further that the expected
changes in tax rates will be driven by their changes at time ttj and ttj-
1: the effect of the demographic shock will only be felt directly at times
ttj and ttj-1, while in the other periods the effects of the shock are
felt indirectly through the changes in the tax rates of other time
periods. It follows that the comparative-statics analysis has to start at
time periods ttj and ttj-1. The argument proceeds along a number of steps.
In every step a sequence of saving rates is assumed positive. As in the
stationary-state savings are zero, it will not be disturbed at times other
than Ltj or ttj-1 if current and previous savings remain equal to zero. So
5) Suppose at time period t the system is outside the stationary-state.
If st - 0 and assuming T- 0, we get from condition (8) ~u'(st-i~) 5
(1-~) u'(1) ~~u'(1), where ~he last inequality follows from ~~~. This
produces the contradiction st-1 ) 1. On the other hend, if st ~ 0
condition (10) holds and assuming T - 0 we get au'(s ) 5
(1-~) u'(} t} n}1Tt41) ~ u'(} f} n.1Tt{1) where A~} has ~eén used
again. It follows t~sï s )} t} n ~ 2}, which is a contradiction
as st s } must always ho~dl see eq. (~~1 ~~~.17
all we need to do is to consider how a demographic shock at time t}j can
initially change the tax rates at times ttj and~or ttj-1 and whether these
changes can drive the saving rates to positive values. Regarding the
interpretation oF the ensuing analysis i t should be stressed that the
calculations are performed at time t. At that time, of course, the future
is still open, and all deviations from the stationary-state have to be
determined as yet. However, with perfect foresight the current generation
of politicians knows the effects future and past changes of tax rates have
on the tax rates holding at any time period. This knowledge is described
by the comparative-statics equations.
Notice first that sttj - sttj-1 - 0 before the demographic change.
Assume these savings remain zero after the change as well. The first-order
conditions for Tt} and Tt4 1 then are of the form ( 8) with savings equal j J-
to zero. The direct effect of dn can be calculated as follows
(nttj t Vttj)dTttj - - Tttjdn (15)
u"(cy )
where Vt;j - 1~~ , r}~ ~ 0, while dzt4j-1 - 0. So the initial effect
u (ct,j-1)
of a demographic change will then be negative, i.e. d2tt ~dn C 0. It
j
follows immediately that if dn ~ 0, sttj cannot become positive so that,
as a result, dTt}h - 0 for h) j. This result holds through if dst}h ~ 0
for h s j-1 as will become clear below.
Given the initial effect ( 15) we can now check whether st} 1) 0
j-
is possible. As a necessary condition for st} 1~ 0 it follows from (7)
j-
that -
d(nttj~ttj) -- ittj dn - nt;jdit}j ~ 0 has to hold. Using (15) we
find that the latter inequality always holds if dn ~ 0. So, assume next
st}j-1 ) 0 and all other saving rates equal to zero. The first-order
conditions for zt} 1 and Ttt , respectively, then read
j' j
au'(n~ttj-1) - (1-~) u'{2(1 -
~ttj-1 } nttjTttj)} - 0 (16)
and
~u'{2(1 - Yt,j-1 } nttj~ttj)} - (1-~) u'(1 - tttj) - o (17)18
The effects of the change in demography can then be calculated from (16)
and (1~)
(n ~ 2 Vttj-1)dTttj-1 - 2 Vt}j-1 Tt;j~ 4 2 nt}jVttj-1dTttj (18)
1 n t ~ 1 1 dT (2 ttj t~j)dTttj -- 2 Tt{jdn i 2 ttj-1 (19)
From eqs. ( 18) and ( 19) it can be derived that dTt}j~dn C 0 and
dTt}j-l~dn ~ 0. From the latter inequality it follows that if dn ) 0 then
sttj-2 cannot increase so that, as a result, dTt{h - 0 for h C j-1. So,
going backward in time we can restrict ourselves to the case of a negative
demographic shock. Extending the comparative-statics analysis underlying
eqs. (18) and (19) it is easy to prove the following
Proposition 6: If in the case where a~ 2 a drop in the rate of
population growth occurs at time ttj, then dittj ~ 0. Furthermore
dTtth - 0 for h) j. Moreover, if stth ~ 0 for h- k,...,j-1 and
k z 0, then dTt}h~dn ~ 0.
The fact that a demographic decline has no effects after the date of the
sliock foLlows from the fact that at the date of the shock the savings do
not become positive. As noted above, in this model changes in the tax
rates can only occur (apart from demographic change) if the saving rate of
the previous and~or next young generation changes. So, for the decision-
making process after time t}j nothing has changed and the stationary-state
will immediately be re-established. In table 2 the effect of demographic
change is summarized for thís case.
Table 2. The effects of a temporary negative demographic shock in the
Stackelberg-case with a ) 2
h C j h- j h~ j
Tt}h S T; st}h 2 s
Tt.h ~ T; st~h - s Tt;h - T; s,T} - s19
Let us next turn to the case of a positive demographic shock
Proposition 7: If in the case where ~~ 2 a rise in the rate of
population growth occurs at time ttj, then dtt}h - 0 for h~ j-1,
dit~ 1~ 0, dT 4~ 0 and a finite number K~ j exists such that j- t j
stfK-1 2 st~K - 0 and dTt4h ( 0 for h- jt1,...,K and dTtth - 0 for
h ~ K.
The first part of the proposition follows from the fact noted above that
if dn ) 0 then strh - 0 for h C j-1. We also have that sttj can be
positive if dn ~ 0. If st}j ) 0 and all other saving rates are zero, then
the effects of demographic change on zt}j is given by
1
(nt~j t 2 Vttj)dTttj -- Tttjdn 4 2 nVttjdTt4jt1 (20j
However, as st}jtl is zero, d2t;jt1 is zero as well. It immediately
follows from (20) that dTt}j~dn ~ 0. However, we can check by evaluating
d(nt}j2t}j) that st}j-1 ~ 0 cannot be excluded. Applying the same
comparative-statics analysis with st}j-1 ~ 0 we find dit4j~dn ) 0 as a
possibility. However, in the latter case we find from (18) dTttj-1 ~ 0 so
that we have the contradiction st4 1- 0. In other words, whatever the j-
value of st}j-1 z 0 the inequality dit}j~dn ~ 0 should hold. The same
result holds through if future saving rates can be assumed positive.
Future positive savings at times tth (h ~ j) can be engendered by positive
savings at times ttj. The fact that sttj ) 0 implies dTttjfl C 0 and leada
to the possibility that st}j41 ~ 0. So a chain of positive savings can
arise due to the positive demographic change and the corresponding tax
rates are below their stationary-state values. The proposition states that
the time interval during which st}h ) 0 and dtt}h ~ 0(h ~ j) occurs is
finite. This final part of the proposition can be proved by a comparative-
statics analysis as above. Suppose that st4j,...,st~j~k-1 are positive for
k) 1, and sttj~k - 0. This implies that the first-order conditions with
respect to the tax rate read20
au'{2(1 -




1 au'{2(1 - T
ttH-1 } nTt}H)} -( 1-a) u'(1 - zt}H) - 0 (22)
where H- jtk. Eqs. (21) follow from eq. (9b) after inserting the savings
of the previous generation in the first-order condition. In eq. (22)
account is taken of the fact that st}j}k - 0.
For the tax rates as from time ttjtl the effects of the demographic
change purely follow from future and~or previous changes in the tax rates.
These effects can be calculated by totally differentiating egs. (21) and
(22) which gives:
(n t Vtth)dTtth - dTtth-1 ` nVt~h dTt}htl h-jtl,...,jtk-1 (~3)
and
1
(2 n ' VttH)dTttH - 2 dzttH-1 H - jtk (24)
The effects on the tax rates at times tth (h ) j) can be calculated as a
function of the change in the tax rate at time ttj by recursive
substitution. For instance, for time ttjtk we get









while for dTt}h (h-jtl,...,k-1) analogous expressions can be derived. From
these expressions it follows that the direction of the change in
ztth
(h ) j) equals the direction of the change in zt}j, so that dTt4h ~ 0. We
finally have to prove that the saving rate will reach the value zeroz~.
within a finite time interval. This follows immediately if n) 1 as then
the expression Ak goes to infinity for k~~, The negative effects of the
demographic change on future tax rates will become infinitely small in the
course of time which implies that for some time ttK savings are no longer
positive, i.e. s - i- 1 T - 1 nT S 0. From that period onwards ttK 2 2 ttK 2 t4Kf1
the stationary-state will be re-established. If n( 1 the expression Ak
could approach zero for increasing k. This implies that the actual tax
rates must be decreasing. So savings will remain positive and condition
(21) holds from which we derive the inequality
Tt}h -
Ttth-1 ~ n(Ttthtl - Tt~h) (27)
Inequality (27) states that if the tax rates decrease, the direction of
the future change cannot be reversed. Then the tax rate will become zero
which is a contradiction as the tax rate will always be positive outside
the stationary-state (see footnote 5). So, Ak cannot converge to zero. It
cannot converge to a finite constant either, because in that case the tax
rate converges to a constant while savings are positive and the factor
Vt;jti in eq. (26) will approach the value 1~A t 1 so that, again, Ak
would approach zero. In other words, in all cases the tax rates have to
increase and savings will be zero within a finite time interval. QED.
In table 3 the effect of demographic change is summarized for this
case.
Table 3. The effects of a temporary positive demographic shock in the
Stackelber 1 g-case with a ) 2
h( j-1 h- J-1 h- j h~ j
Tt~h - i; St~h- S Tt}h ~ T; St}hZ S Tt}h ~ T;Stth2 3 Tt}h S T; Stth2 S
Regarding the path of the tax rates in the both cases of a negative
and positive demographic shock, respectively, we can establish22
Proposition 8: For negative and positive demographic shocks the tax
rates will move continuously in the same direction. In particular,
~tthtl ~ Ttth
for h( j in case of a negative demographic shock and
~tthtl ~ Tt.h
for h~ j in case of a positive demographic shock.
The proof of proposition 8 uses inequality (2~) for both negative and
positive demographic shocks. Take first the case dnt}j ( 0. Suppose at
time ttk savings become positive, i.e.
sttk-1 - 0 and st~k ) 0 for
U s k C j. Then from the first-order condition at time ttk (see eq. (16)
with k- j) we derive nT ~ 1
ttk 2(1 - Tttk ` nit~k}1) or n(2t;k - 2t.kt1) ~
2(1 -~ttk - nTttktl) ~ 0. So, T - T C 0. But then, according to ttktl ttk
(~7) Ttthtl - Ttth ( 0 as well for k( h C j. For the case of a positive
demographic shock, assume savings become zero at time ttk, i.e. s ~ 0
ttk-1
- sttk, for k ~ j. From the first-order condition at time ttk (see eq.
i22) with k- H) we derive 12(1 - Tttk-1 ` nTttk) ~ I-~ttk' or
(1 - T )~ 1-? -- nT . Moreover, because s ~ 0, we also 2 1 t;k-1 lttk 2 ttk ttk-1
have 2(1 -
Tttk-I) ~ 2 nTttk, Combining the last two inequalities we find
that
Tttk '~ttk-1 ~ 0. But then, according to (27), it should also hold
that
Ttth - ztfh-1 ~ 0 for j( h C k. QED.
As an illustration of propositions 6, ~ and 8 figures 1 and 2 give
typical paths of tax and saving rates under demographic change.
insert figures 1 and 2 here
As a byproduct of the proof of proposition ~ we can also give a
proof of proposition 3. In particular eqs. (25) and (26) give the
evolution of the tax rate Tt;k for a~ perturbation dTt ~c 0. So, if the
system gets off its stationary-state and ~~ 2, then the stationary-state
will be restored within a finite time interval. Actually this is a basic
result of our model. It ensures that the effects of (demographic) shocks
will be of a finite length so that decision makers gifted with perfect
foresight can actually calculate what course of action they have to take
themselves. This is, however, not the case if ~~ 2. From eqs. (25) and
(26) we see that dtttk ~ 0 if n~ 1, never actually reaching the
stationary-state. If n~ 1, the development may even be away from its
stationary-state T- 0, s- 2. The state s- 0, t~ 0 will not be an23
equilibrium as savings cannot remain zero for more than one period.
Thereafter the tax rate will decrease and may keep on decreasing, but also
in that case it cannot return to the stationary-state due to eq. (25). So,
when a( Z the stationary-state will never be restored within a finite
time interval. Then the whole expectation-formation mechanism breaks down
as an infinite number of calculations is in that case needed to calculate
the effects of demographic shocks. In other words, the current decision-
makers are not able to choose an optimal tax rate as an unambiguous path
of future tax and saving rates is not available. Note, however, that for
the case where a~ 2 demographic shocks do not have any effect anyhow. So,
we have the paradoxical case in which a stationary-state cannot be
restored if it is broken, but if the system is in the stationary-state, it
cannot be broken by exogenous shocks. Finally, it should be remarked that
the lack of stability or the lack of convergence within a finite interval
for this case where ~~ 2 might be due to peculiarities of our model.
However, it might also be a general characteristic of overlapping-
generations models where generations are not linked to each other by
public or private transfers.
5. The economic interpretation of the model
The results that have been derived in the sections 3 and 4 are very
general in the sense that they do not depend on a specific utility
Function and that the modelling of the decision-making by the government
can be interpreted in different ways (see footnote 3). Another feature of
the model is the assumption of perfect foresight. As already has been
pointed out in the introduction, one of the great advantages of assuming
perfect foresight is that the expectations of agents can be modelled
without making use of ad hoc assumptions. Moreover, the way expectations
are treated here makes it possible to easily calculate the stationary-
states and dynamic paths the system will follow in different circumstances
provided disturbances of the stationary-state will dampen out within a
finite time interval which, as mentioned, in section 4, will only be true
if transfers exist in the stationary-state. Admittedly, the model could24
improve in terms of plausibility if uncertainty would be introduced,
especially since the model essentielly describes the situation on the long
run (one period equals a generation, see footnote 2). Although this might
be an interesting extension, this is not done here as it would complicate
matters considerably without adding anything essential to the argument of
the previous sections. Furthermore, the problem of pensions is
deliberately modelled in a highly stylized way to get a grip on the basic
features. To give but one example, no excess burdens of taxation have been
assumed. This is the major reason why in this model corner solutions are
arrived at in the stationary-state. Interior solutions of tax rates and
saving rates could occur simultaneously if the young might be able to
decrease their endowment if confronted with an increase in the tax rate.
Note that such excess burdens would prevent corner solutions from arising
as well in median-voter models (see e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981}.
With respect to the institutional setting underlying the model it
should be pointed out that in assuming total discretionary power of
politicians over the current tax rate only the model is implicitly limited
to the case of a pure tax-transfer system as opposed to an insurance
system. However, as demonstrated in Thompson (1983, see also Verbon, 1988,
Ch. 6) the tax-transfer vision has become the dominant one in the actual
operation of public pension schemes. More important is the way the
supposed institutional framework influences the possibility of exploiting
the perfect knowledge of the system by means of Stackelberg-behavior. By
assuming decentralized and uncoordinated decision-making by young
individuals it is excluded that these are the Stackelberg-leaders towards
the politicians. 6j Another point is that it has been assumed until now
that both young individuals and politicians cannot be the Stackelberg-
leaders towards future generations of decision-makers, although this does
not seem to be impossible at first sight. In fact this case has been
worked out by Veall (1986). In Veall's paper the current generation of
young individuals determines the savings and the tax rate in a game where
they are the Stackelberg-leaders towards the next generation of young
-------------------------------------------------------
6) Alternatively, in a number of countries, notably the Netherlands,
decision-making on private pension funds is centralized, which opens up
the possiblity for the young to actually exploit their knowledge about the
political decision-making process. See Verbon and Verhoeven (1990) for an
extensive treatment of this case.25
individuals, which is essentially the same as the current generation. In
particular, the current young calculate the reaction of their successors
under the assumption that the latter will decide while taking all future
decision-making as given. This, however, seems inconsistent with the
assumptions of perfect foresight and rational behavior of the current
young, that underlie both this and Veall's paper. For, if the current
young know the next generation's decision-making they will also know that
the latter will be the Stackelberg-leaders towards the then next
generation, which generation would in turn behave likewise. This implies
that if the current young want to avoid time inconsistency, they have to
be able to forecast the reaction of the next generation on current
decisions. This reaction has to be known before the young take decisions
themselves. However, this leads to an infinite loop as current decisions
can only be taken if future reactions are known, while these future
reactions in turn should be of the same form as the current decisions. We
can conclude that Veall's approach is unsatisfactory and that the
assumption of Stackelberg-behavior of current towards future generations
in a framework of perfect foresight and rational behavior is not a
consistent one.
In the light of the above remarks, we need to qualify our perfect
foresight hypothesis. In the above argument it was implicitly assumed that
perfect foresight referred to both the future outcomes of the system and
the way these decisions will be arrived at, or, equivalently, that
decision-makers had perfect foresight as regards to both ex-post and ex-
ante expectations. So, apart from the actual path of future saving rates
and tax rates (ex-post), decision-makers also have the information to
calculate the path in alternative circumstances (ex-ante). From the above
consistency argument it follows that we have to drop the assumption that
politicians have the latter kind of information about future politicians,
although they can have that information with respect to the current or
future savers. They have no alternative but to take the future decisions
of politicians as given. Conceptually, we could think of this as the
introduction of a kind of Central Forecasting Bureau that is able to
generate forecasts of tax rates and savings and transmits only the end
results to the decision-makers.26
We can conclude that the assumption of Nash-behavior towards future
generations seems satisfactory, provided that there exists a certain
institutional framework that guarantees that the decision-makers have the
relevant information about future outcomes without giving them the
opportunity to exploit this knowledge totally. Finally, as has already
been mentioned in section 2, the existence of such a Nash-equilibrium can
be proved.
The last point to be raised in this section concerns the exogeneity
that is assumed with respect to the demographic and economic development
and the institutional framework. Dropping this assumption indeed implies
an interesting field of research. The omission of these aspects in this
paper can however be warranted by the fact that we have limited ourselves
here to a part.ial analysis aimed at the development of the pension system
as such.
6. Conclusions
In this paper the evolution of public and private pension schemes
represented by the tax rate of the public pension scheme and the saving
rate of the young, respectively, has been studied. We assumed that
decisions on these two schemes are taken by a political process that fixes
the benefit and tax rates for public pensions, while the young determine
independently from each other their saving rates. For the evolution of
both schemes the expectations generations have of future decisions in a
changing environment is of primary importance. One of the main interests
for setting up this study is in trying to model these expectations in a
consistent way, which is as far as we are able to see one of the main
problems in the literature on public pension schemes. We model
expectations in the following way. A distinction is made between ex-ante
and ex-post expectations. As explained before, under ex-ante expectations
the future can be manipulated by current decision-makers while under ex-
post expectations the complete future is known but has to be taken as
given. In our model both politicians and young individuals can have ex-
ante information about the other party's contemporaneous decisions. Butyoung individuals cannot make use of this information because of the
decentralized character of their decision-making. Decision-makers can only
have ex-post expectations with respect to future developments of the
system. This set-up can only be useful, however, if these ex-ante and ex-
post expectations can be actually calculated at the time of decision-
making, i.e. if the system described in our model will return to a
stationary-state after a disturbance of the equilibrium by, e.g. a
demographic shock. This appears to be the case if transfers exist in the
stationary-state. The path towards this stationary-state can then be
calculated.
It appeared that intertemporal efficiency is of no importance in
the stationary-state. Only the political power of the old and young
generations, which are alive at the time the decisions are made, count in
this respect. This is not too amazing, of course, because in the political
process as we described it, public pension benefita only serve as a means
to redistribute income from the young to the old.
c]iven the treatment of expectations described above we could
consider the effects of possible future demographic changes in a
stationary-state with a positive tax rate. As regards to a future
demographic change, the effects of such a change on tax rates or saving
rates, as mentioned above, appear to have a finite length after a change.
Moreover, the paths are of a'smooth' nature in the sense that before or
after the change, -in anticipation of the effects calculated by the
'Central Forecasting Bureau'- the relevant instrument increases or
decreases constantly until the shock occurs respectively the stationary-
state is reached. So, no cycles occur in which decision-makers are
continuously correcting their errors in expectations, but, on the
contrary, decision-makers correctly anticipate the incorporation of the
change in the tax or saving rate which is implemented by the next
generation. The deviations from the stationary-state predominantly occur
either before or after the demographic shock.
As a consequence of the above results, we can interpret changes in
private pension schemes as temporary deviations from a stationary-state in
which, in the context of our stylized model, no private pension scheme
exists anyhow. Adaptation of private pension schemes is engendered by
demographic (or other exogenous) changes. As negative demographic shocks28
disturb the stationary-state before the shock actually occurs and positive
shocks exert their influence forwards, this interpretation suggests in the
context of our model that private pensions exist when positive demographic
shocks have been experienced in the past and~or negative shocks are
foreseen in the future. The same interpretation, however, cannot hold for
public pension schemes, as a stationary-state without public pensions
cannot be broken by temporary exogenous shocks. As a consequence, for the
existence of public pension plans a high level of political power of the
old is needed (or, alternatively, a high level of altruism of young
individuals, see footnote 3), since then there will be a stationary-state
with positive transfers. This result corresponds to Browning (1975). The
development of a mixed public and private pension system, that can be
observed in actual fact, should then be explained by the occurrence of
(positive demographic) shocks in the past and (negative demographic)
shocks in the anticipated future.
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